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Principal consumer:
President Biden’s approach to intelligence
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On 20 January 2021, Joe Biden became president of the United States, assuming
responsibility for the largest and most well-financed intelligence community
ever created. This community encompasses an array of capabilities in collection,
analysis, surveillance, special forces, covert operations and cyber warfare. What
can it expect from its new commander-in-chief ? This article represents the first
assessment of Biden as ‘principal consumer’, highlighting his approach to intelligence.
Biden takes command of the 18 federal agencies and offices that comprise
the sprawling intelligence community in tumultuous times, characterized by an
interventionist Russia; an authoritarian China that is challenging the rules-based
international order; nuclear sabre-rattling by Iran and North Korea; and the
homecoming, after 20 years, of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Three decades after
Francis Fukuyama’s prediction about the triumph of liberal democracy, ‘history’
and great power rivalry have returned.1 Once again, intelligence will be central to
national security. Since the time of Fukuyama’s writing, it has also taken on new
tasks, monitoring and responding to globalized security challenges from climate
change to pandemics.2
Biden has become principal consumer at a moment of transition not only in
international affairs, but in the business of spying as well. To quote Alex Younger,
former head of Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), ‘the fourth industrial
revolution’ has introduced ‘fourth-generation espionage’.3 In essence, intelligence
work is being transformed by bulk data and modern analytics, bringing both
opportunities and challenges. While case officers still sound out potential agents at
embassy cocktail parties, evade surveillance and execute brush passes, intelligence
gatherers and analysts, aided by artificial intelligence, increasingly complement
We are grateful to reviewers, friends on both sides of the Atlantic and the journal’s copy-editing team for their
constructive suggestions on earlier drafts of this article.
Jennifer Welsh, The return of history: conflict, migration, and geopolitics in the twenty-first century (Toronto: House
of Anansi Press, 2016).
Calder Walton, US intelligence, the coronavirus and the age of globalized challenges, Center for International Governance Innovation, 24 Aug. 2020, https://www.cigionline.org/articles/us-intelligence-coronavirus-and-ageglobalized-challenges/. (Unless otherwise noted at point of citation, all URLs cited in this article were
accessible on 25 Oct. 2021.)
Alex Younger, ‘MI6 “C” speech on fourth generation espionage’, 3 Dec. 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/mi6-c-speech-on-fourth-generation-espionage.
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these activities with competence in handling massive datasets, facial recognition
software and the Internet of Things.4 Problematically, building an effective cover
for clandestine officers has never been harder, since every potential recruit has a
digital footprint, generated by years of engagement with social media and other
contemporary technologies, which follows them into the profession.
Alongside this revolution in collection and analysis, there has been a steady
militarization of intelligence. Since 9/11, as David Oakley and Mark Mazzetti
have argued, intelligence has been intertwined with—even subordinated to—
military operations.5 Convinced of the importance of integration and interoperability, desiring to run secret detention and interrogation programmes, and
driven by multiple exigencies in the ‘war on terror’, policy-makers have made
tactical support to the military—especially the hunting down of terrorists—a
community-wide priority. If the defining image of twentieth-century intelligence was that of a trenchcoated ‘cultural attaché’ servicing dead drops on the
streets of Vienna, that of the early twenty-first would be a fatigue-clad operator
leading an elite team of door-kickers to capture or kill suspected terrorists in
Kandahar or Mogadishu.
On top of this, Biden has become principal consumer at a low point in relations
between the White House and the intelligence community. Under his predecessor,
Donald Trump, friction between the commander-in-chief and the community
reached unprecedented levels. Against the background of sustained efforts to
impeach him, Trump accused the community of being part of a ‘deep state’—a
conglomeration of Obama-era leftovers within the bureaucracy, hostile media
organizations and big tech, colluding to wreck his presidency. On the investigations into Russian intervention in his election, he sided with Vladimir Putin
over his own spy chiefs, even calling intelligence officers ‘Nazis’.6 On Twitter, he
used quotation marks around the word ‘intelligence’ to signal his contempt for
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). During his first visit to CIA headquarters, he stood in front of the memorial wall, hallowed ground commemorating
the agency’s fallen, bragging about the size of his inauguration crowd. To the
frustration of many, he showed, throughout his term, apathy towards intelligence
product. He was believed to have rarely read the President’s Daily Brief (PDB),
the most highly classified document in Washington, as shown by his ignorance of
an alleged Russian operation to reward Islamist fighters in Afghanistan for killing
American troops there—even though this had been highlighted in the brief.7 At
the CIA, his lack of interest in intelligence is well remembered. In one story,
Amy Zegart, Spies, lies and algorithms: the history and future of American intelligence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, forthcoming 2022).
David Oakley, Subordinating intelligence: the DoD/CIA post-Cold War relationship (Lexington, KY: University
Press of Kentucky, 2019); Mark Mazzetti, The way of the knife: the CIA, a secret army, and a war at the ends of the
Earth (New York: Penguin, 2013).
Christopher R. Moran and Richard J. Aldrich, ‘Trump and the CIA: borrowing from Nixon’s playbook’,
Foreign Affairs, publ. online April 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-04-24/trump-and-cia.
Carol Lee, Mike Memoli and Elyse Perlmutter-Gumbiner, ‘Biden puts the “Daily” back into the administration’s intelligence briefings’, NBC, 25 Jan. 2021, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/bidenputs-daily-back-administration-s-intelligence-briefings-n1255554.
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while hosting a high-level intelligence meeting at his golf club in Bedminster,
New Jersey, in 2017, a visibly bored Trump interrupted the senior officials there,
asking: ‘Does anyone want a malt?’ Summoning a waiter into the room, where
code-word material was being discussed, he boasted: ‘We have the best malts, you
have to try them’, stupefying everyone present.8
Appalled, spy chiefs—including director of the FBI James Comey and director
of the CIA (DCIA) John Brennan—publicly attacked Trump, disregarding the
tradition that intelligence officers, like their counterparts in the armed forces,
should keep out of politics. When the president rejected the community’s conclusion that Russia had meddled in the 2016 election, Brennan characterized his
comments as ‘nothing short of treasonous’.9 Later, in his memoirs, he insinuated
that Trump was a domestic security threat.10 These are strong words, even for an
Obama loyalist, and there is an argument that Brennan has only emboldened people
who dismiss such voices as ‘Never Trumpers’ from the deep state, producing the
unintended effect of further undermining the intelligence community’s standing
with them. Consequently, a key objective for Biden will be to restore normality to
relations between the president and the intelligence community while rebuilding
trust in the community’s institutions, overturning what Daniel Drezner, in this
journal, has called Trump’s damaging legacy.11
It is within this context that this article evaluates Biden’s approach to intelligence. Unlike most of his predecessors, who were sworn in with scant knowledge
of the community, Biden has decades of experience in intelligence affairs, in both
the Executive and Legislative branches. He has read four different iterations of the
PDB. As vice-president-elect, he had access to George W. Bush’s briefing. Then,
for eight years, he consumed Barack Obama’s version of this, which First Lady
Michelle Obama called ‘the Death, Destruction, and Horrible Things Book’.12
Then, as president-elect, he received copies of Trump’s—albeit after a three-week
delay because the outgoing president refused to concede the election.13 And now
he has his own. As a member of Congress, he gained even more expertise. In
1976, he became a charter member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
(SSCI), heading its subcommittee on secrecy and disclosure. From the late 1990s
to 2009 he either chaired, or served as the ranking member of, the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. What can we learn from this?
As advocates of ‘applied history’, we take the view that there is sufficient clarity
in Biden’s past to make sound inferences about his administration’s likely approach
to intelligence. To be sure, neither the record of his career nor, for that matter,
Natasha Bertrand and Kyle Cheney, ‘Biden would revamp fraying intelligence community’, Politico, 19 Oct.
2020, https://www.politico.com/news/2020/10/19/biden-revamp-fraying-intel-community-430090.
John Brennan, Twitter, 4: 52 p.m., 16 July 2018.
John Brennan, Undaunted: my fight against America’s enemies, at home and abroad (New York: Celadon Books,
2020).
Daniel Drezner, ‘Immature leadership: Donald Trump and the American presidency’, International Affairs 96:
2, 2020, pp. 383–400.
Barack Obama, A promised land (New York: Crown, 2020), p. 312.
David Priess, ‘The president’s Daily Brief and presidents-elect: a primer’, Lawfare Blog, 17 Nov. 2020, https://
www.lawfareblog.com/presidents-daily-brief-and-presidents-elect-primer.
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any historical record offers an infallible prediction of the future. His preferences
are but one element of a multidimensional complexity, not only in international
affairs but within American politics as well. As scholars of foreign policy analysis
have shown, any implementation of strategy will have to confront the problem of
other nations and non-state actors, who have their own plans, all operating within
an often intractable external environment.14 Within the United States, as Gregory
Smith suggests—taking his cue from the scholarship of bureaucratic politics,
which holds that the president remains just another actor in Washington—intelligence-led security policy-making is a process leading to negotiated outcomes
and is propelled by more than the White House alone. Even presidents with
well-conceived ideas about intelligence can see their intentions derailed by larger,
unpredictable forces, with elite groups proving to be particularly effective in
constraining the power of the president in this sphere of activity.15 Nevertheless,
Biden’s record is the best empirical information we have. His career and administration remain works in progress, while his presidential papers will remain classified for many years. We are keen to explore what this record, marshalled with
caution and care, reveals.
We make three arguments. The first is that Biden is a pro-intelligence president with a well-defined approach to the subject—covering what intelligence
ought to be about, how it should operate and what it must produce. This has
remained consistent throughout his career. In making this claim, our article speaks
to an important debate about the purpose of intelligence in the United States,
long contested by presidents, legislators, secretaries in the cabinet, intelligence
leaders, journalists and academics.16 In 1947, against the background of the rising
threat of the Soviet Union and memories of the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor,
President Harry Truman reified the intelligence community, placing it under
the control of the National Security Council (NSC) and the director of central
intelligence (DCI), enabling it to rise above bureaucratic disputes between the
Departments of State and Defense, the army and the navy. As the first DCI, Rear
Admiral Sidney Souers, phrased it, Truman regarded the agency as ‘his personal
intelligence service ... It was to keep him personally well informed of all that
was going on in the outside world’—hence his frequent plea to it: ‘Where’s my
newspaper?’17 By contrast, successors such as Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy
and Ronald Reagan preferred an approach that foregrounded covert action—
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There is a big difference between large-scale, open-ended deployments of tens of thousands
of American combat troops, which must end, and using a few hundred Special Forces
soldiers and intelligence assets to support local partners against a common enemy. Those
smaller-scale missions are sustainable militarily, economically, and politically.20

Privately, however, he is assailed by doubts about exposure and failure, and
has reservations about the fusion of intelligence and war-fighting. It is hard to
18

19

20

Arthur Hulnick, ‘The intelligence producer–policy consumer linkage: a theoretical approach’, Intelligence and
National Security 1: 2, 1986, pp. 212–33; Mark Lowenthal, ‘Tribal tongues: intelligence consumer, intelligence
producers’, Washington Quarterly 15: 1, 1992, pp. 157–68; Jami Miscik, ‘Intelligence and the presidency: how
to get it right’, Foreign Affairs 96: 3, 2017, pp. 57–64.
Lindsay O’Rourke, Covert regime change: America’s secret Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018);
Rory Cormac and Richard J. Aldrich, ‘Grey is the new black: covert action and implausible deniability’, International Affairs 94: 3, 2018, pp. 477–94; Austin Carson, Secret wars: covert conflict in international politics (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2018); James Lockhart, ‘How effective are covert operations? Reevaluating the
CIA’s intervention in Chile, 1964–1973’, Marine Corps University Journal 10: 1, 2019, pp. 21–49; Michael Poznansky, In the shadow of international law: secrecy and regime change in the post-war world (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2020).
Joseph Biden, ‘Why America must lead again: rescuing US foreign policy after Trump’, Foreign Affairs 99: 2,
2020, p. 72.
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intervening in the affairs of other countries in a way that was surreptitious and
plausibly deniable. This, of course, has always been a question of preferences and
priorities rather than an exclusive choice. Just as Truman authorized some covert
operations—for example, in Italian elections—Eisenhower, JFK and Reagan read
intelligence reports and estimates.
Biden’s approach to intelligence aligns with Truman’s. He values intelligence
product, particularly the PDB, which he consumes avidly, because he wants to
see, understand and counter threats before they blow up as crises. He reserves his
highest praise for collectors and analysts while holding that it is the sacred duty
of the intelligence community to speak truth to power while insisting that the
entire system remain apolitical. He is adept at giving clear strategic direction to
intelligence leaders and briefers, so that they know what to prioritize and how
to present information to him. He has a track record of defending the agency,
one of his primary interfaces with the community, in Congress and in bureaucratic Washington. He is passionate about safeguarding secrecy and stopping leaks,
to ensure that the intelligence arriving on his desk is never compromised. After
Trump, these are attributes many within the community will welcome as balm
for the soul. Moreover, as readers familiar with the literature on the intelligence–
policy linkage will recognize, these are qualities that writers have long argued
should be desirable in a principal consumer.18
Biden’s approach reflects uneasiness about covert action, a subject that has seen a
proliferation of scholarship in recent years, assessing its use and effectiveness.19 He
is particularly sceptical and risk-averse when such operations work hand in glove
with military or paramilitary forces, especially in the global South. Here, there is a
distinction between his public and private positions. Publicly, he has indicated his
support for covert action as a valuable ‘third option’ in certain complicated situations when diplomacy fails and landing marines is out of the question. In spring
2020, he wrote in Foreign Affairs:
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imagine him authorizing, say, the arming of coup plotters or rebels in the global
South: paramilitary covert action and secret wars will be off the table. On the
strict proviso that they are well coordinated, feature an exit strategy, are properly
authorized and put before congressional overseers, he will probably entertain only
what Loch Johnson has called ‘low-threshold’ covert operations—low-risk intrusions entailing no use of force that make little infringement upon other nations’
sovereignty.21 Examples might be financial assistance to a friendly foreign leader
or modest influence operations, like the use of propaganda to smear and splinter
an adversary. In short, Biden will clash with advocates of covert action and special
operations if they propose anything comparable to earlier interventions in Cuba,
El Salvador or Afghanistan.
Our second argument is that Biden’s scepticism about paramilitary covert
action, the militarization of intelligence, and more generally the use of force in the
global South derives not from some Kantian moral stance—‘do no evil, though the
world shall perish’—but from lessons he learned in Congress from Vietnam and
from the Reagan administration’s interventions in central America. Calculations
about risk and mission creep, bordering on an obsession, dominate his thinking.
These calculations are underpinned by the genuine desire of a conscientious
public servant, who understands loss, not to endanger American lives needlessly.
This was manifest in his opposition, as vice-president, to the Obama administration’s counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan, and to the Bin Laden raid in
Pakistan, both of which foreshadowed his controversial decision, as president, to
withdraw from Afghanistan. These lessons are likely to guide his decision-making
on paramilitary operations and, more generally, on intervention, throughout his
tenure.
Our third argument is that Biden’s wariness and risk aversion towards the
activist and paramilitary approach to intelligence also stems from his sensitivity
to domestic political conditions. An ambitious man, albeit not a seeker of glory,
Biden is finely attuned to the ever-changing direction of political winds. He lacks
the rigid ideological positions of many in his party, and possesses a degree of
flexibility that some do not. His paramount question will always be a practical
one: ‘How will any given decision concerning covert action or use of force play in
Congress, the press, the Democratic base and the public?’ To those who prefer that
the commander-in-chief represent voters and taxpayers while properly seeking
the advice and consent of Capitol Hill, this will be welcome news. But those who
would suggest that there are times when the president should accept the assessments of professionals in the intelligence community and the military should
prepare themselves to lose more arguments than they win, as Biden will defer
to domestic political considerations whenever this counsel causes his political
antennae to twitch.

Loch Johnson, ‘On drawing a bright line for covert operations’, American Journal of International Law 86: 2, 1992,
pp. 284–309.
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You know what I miss most, for real, from those four years? The PDB (laughter). No, you
think I’m joking. I am not. A sense of knowing where all the pieces were. Whether we had
it all down ... And so now I have access again—and to the chagrin of many of you, I read
it in detail. (Laughter) And I ask questions of my briefers and follow up with my team.23

Continuing, he said that he wanted ‘straight-from-the-shoulder assessments’—
‘even if the news is hard, even if the news is bad’—and pledged to keep intelligence
apolitical: ‘I promise you: You will never see a time, while I’m President, when my
administration in any way tries to affect or alter your judgements about what you
think the situation we face is. I’ll never politicize the work you do.’24 Elsewhere,
he named Russia and China as his highest priorities in national security—even
referring to Moscow and Beijing as ‘possible mortal competitors’.25
This speech was consistent with Biden’s long history of backing the intelligence
community. Perhaps the earliest example of this came in January 1977, when he
blocked the nomination of Theodore Sorensen as DCI before it reached a Senate
vote. A studious aide and brilliant speechwriter for President Kennedy, Sorensen
had been chosen by President-elect Jimmy Carter on account of his willingness to
reduce the agency’s budget and power, which was one of the promises on which
Carter had campaigned. Across the aisle, there were doubts about Sorensen. He had
raised conscientious objections during the Korean War, had limited experience in
foreign policy and knew nothing of the secret world. To others, in respect of his
eligibility for what was an apolitical position, his closeness to the Kennedys raised
red flags. Among the courtiers of Camelot, Sorensen had ranked second only to
Jack’s brother, Bobby, and he had remained a devoted consigliere to the family ever
since, helping in 1969 to write the apology and initiate the damage control that
would save the young Senator Ted Kennedy after the Chappaquiddick incident.
Many within the intelligence community were enraged by the nomination, one
officer telling journalists that Sorensen would be ‘about as well received at Langley
22
23

24
25
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After becoming president, Biden waited several months before meeting with rankand-file intelligence officers. Already, the press had reported that he was putting
the ‘daily’ back into the PDB, even insisting that Vice-President Kamala Harris
attend the briefing when they were both in Washington.22 When, on 27 July 2021,
he took the short journey across the Potomac to visit the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence (ODNI), another of his primary interfaces with the community, there was none of the political grandstanding that there had been four years
earlier when his predecessor had pressed the flesh at the CIA. Biden assured those
present that he was an active consumer of intelligence, explaining that what he
had missed most about being out of office was his daily intelligence digest:

Lee et al., ‘Biden puts the “Daily” back’.
‘Remarks by President Biden at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’, Washington DC, 27 July
2021,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/07/27/remarks-by-presidentbiden-at-the-office-of-the-director-of-national-intelligence/.
‘Remarks by President Biden’.
‘Remarks by President Biden’.
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as General [William] Sherman in Atlanta’.26 The last outsider to head the CIA,
James Schlesinger, had taken so seriously his presidential directive to curtail the
agency’s directorate of operations that he fired 7 per cent of its workforce, earning
himself the nickname ‘Nixon’s axe man’.27 Further, if Sorensen were confirmed, it
was feared that his youthful decisions as a conscientious objector would put him in
an impossible position when dealing with military personnel in the community,
a problem which would be exacerbated by his apparent intention to expose the
CIA to critics ‘anxious to reduce it to a public library’.28 Leading Republicans
shared these concerns. Senator Barry Goldwater, SSCI vice-chairman and one of
the agency’s greatest advocates, declined to take the customary courtesy call from
the nominee.29
Enter Biden. As a member of the SSCI, he was directly involved in the confirmation process. He initially considered the appointment sound. However, as
the intelligence community’s objections grew louder, he pulled his support and
sought out a skeleton in Sorensen’s closet to kill the candidacy. He unearthed an
affidavit, which had never been admitted as evidence, that Sorensen had given
to the defence in the trial of Daniel Ellsberg, leaker of ‘the Pentagon Papers’. In
this affidavit, Sorensen revealed that in 1964, when he had left the White House,
he took seven boxes of classified material as sources for his biography of JFK. He
added that officials routinely leaked far more sensitive documents than Ellsberg
without facing prosecution, and so he condoned the latter’s actions.30 Biden gave
the affidavit to SSCI chairman Senator Daniel Inouye. A Medal of Honor winner
who had lost his right arm to a German hand grenade in 1945 and who said he
would gladly give his left one to win the Cold War, Inouye was appalled that
someone with such a nonchalant attitude to classification was being considered for
a position in which secrecy was the most important part of the job description. At
the hearings, Biden sprung the affidavit on the shocked nominee, announcing: ‘I’m
not sure whether Mr. Sorensen could be indicted or convicted under the espionage statutes.’31 According to Sorensen, ‘it was like being blind-sided by a truck’.32
With this, he withdrew his nomination, firing a parting shot that Biden should
be given ‘a prize for political hypocrisy in a town noted for political hypocrisy’.33
Throughout the 1980s, Biden cultivated a reputation for pushing back against
efforts to open up the community to greater public scrutiny. Early in Reagan’s
first term, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) campaigned for the legal
protection of whistleblowers and the journalists they talked to. The pressure
group was particularly opposed to the Intelligence Identities Protection Act,
which made it a federal crime for anyone intentionally to disclose the identities
Unlisted author, ‘Rejection of Sorensen: a drama of human failing’, New York Times, 2 Feb. 1977.
Christopher R. Moran, ‘Nixon’s axe man: CIA director James R. Schlesinger’, Journal of American Studies 53:
1, 2019, pp. 95–121.
Charles Bartlett, ‘What did in Sorensen’, Washington Star, 19 Jan. 1977.
‘Rejection of Sorensen’.
‘Rejection of Sorensen’.
‘Rejection of Sorensen’.
Lee Lescaze, ‘Sorensen story: “like being blind-sided by a truck”’, Washington Post, 19 Jan. 1977.
‘Rejection of Sorensen’.
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of US covert agents abroad. Biden repeatedly backed the CIA as it fought this.
In one hearing, in April 1980, he had strong words for the ACLU: ‘Let me tell
you something, fellas. The folks don’t care. The average American couldn’t care
less right now about any of this. You keep talking about public concern. There
ain’t none.’34 Biden was especially offended by Philip Agee, the case officer who
had blown the cover of many of his former colleagues and inspired Congress
to draft the Act in the first place. After Goldwater called for the revocation of
Agee’s citizenship, Biden upped the ante, demanding: ‘We should lock him up.’35
In these battles, Biden aligned himself with intelligence professionals to protect
classified information while staking out a position that the exposure of wrongdoing and oversight were best handled through formal channels, rather than the
informal efforts of whistleblowers, reporters and citizen activists.
In doing so, Biden showed himself to be a street-smart politician who
responded to electoral realities, not ideology. Following the intelligence scandals
of the 1970s, when journalists and an assertive Congress had revealed that the
agency had overstepped its charter and even operated against citizens within
the United States, public approval of the CIA had plummeted. In 1975, Gallup
reported that a mere 14 per cent of Americans viewed it favourably.36 Senator
Frank Church, for one, tried to ride this wave of anti-intelligence sentiment to
the White House, albeit unsuccessfully.37 But by the 1980s, the mood had turned
around, a shift best represented by the appearance of an invigorated conservative
movement led by Reagan—who delighted voters with his pledge to ‘unleash the
CIA’. Even President Carter, in his final year in office, authorized modest covert
operations in Afghanistan, Nicaragua and Grenada. Sensing this shift, Biden,
for his own political advancement, chose not to censure the agency and the rest
of the community, as some in his party continued to do, but rather to lend it
countenance, helping to usher in what one journalist characterized as ‘a new age
of permissiveness’.38
In the mid-1980s, Biden teamed up with DCI Bill Casey against leakers. He
sponsored legislation designed to counter ‘graymailing’, a legal tactic used in
whistleblower cases where the defence threatens to reveal state secrets at trial
to strongarm the government into dropping its charges. Casey commended this
‘helpful attitude’, calling it ‘gratifying’.39 Particularly pleasing to him was ‘the
tongue lashing’ that Biden gave the Department of Justice (DOJ) for its ‘passive
attitude and general ineffectiveness’ in dealing with this problem.40 Following
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Ally in bureaucratic Washington
Biden has long regarded the CIA as primus inter pares in the intelligence community. He has supported it not only against problematic nominees and in congressional and public disputes over secrecy, but also in the incessant bureaucratic turf
wars inside the Beltway. While serving on the Hill, he lobbied for more power
41
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‘Biden’s love affair with the CIA’, American Prospect, 10 Oct. 2019, https://prospect.org/power/joe-bidenslove-affair-with-the-cia-william-casey/.
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this, Biden proposed a combination of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ responses. At the soft end,
in 1983 he co-sponsored a bill to support the establishment of a National Historical
Intelligence Museum.41 Although this never made it to a vote, the idea was that
such a museum would have helped to educate the public—where, to quote Casey,
there was a ‘groundswell of apathy’ about the danger that leaks posed.42 On the
hard side, Biden called for the wider enforcement of the Espionage Act of 1917,
a tough stance that echoed an earlier speech he had given at Stanford University, where he had declared that leakers provoked in him the same anger as Julius
and Ethel Rosenberg, enemy spies who were given the electric chair for passing
nuclear secrets to Moscow.43 Casey cheerfully endorsed all of this, insisting that
‘nothing can be done about the leak problem unless some of the offenders are
identified and penalized’.44
Later, as vice-president, Biden continued to protect secrecy. In 2010, he likened
Julian Assange, the founder of WikiLeaks, to ‘a high-tech terrorist’—a description
that contrasted with calmer remarks from other administration officials—accusing
the Australian activist of jeopardizing sources and methods.45 At the time of
writing, President Biden has shown no appetite to let Assange go free, instructing
prosecutors to continue their efforts to extradite him from Britain.
Indeed, during Obama’s tenure, Biden supported policies that saw more whistleblowers prosecuted than all previous administrations combined.46 He personally
directed efforts to thwart fugitive leaker Edward Snowden’s bid to claim asylum,
telephoning the president of Ecuador to implore him not to grant sanctuary to
the erstwhile National Security Agency contractor. Chillingly, Biden warned that
there would be ‘consequences’ for any country that did.47 Despite the customary
platitudes on the 2020 campaign about promoting transparency, the reality remains
that Biden has a history of reacting against and even vilifying leakers. As president,
it is likely that he will continue to resist any reforms designed to protect them.
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to be placed ‘in the hands’ of the DCIA to better coordinate the production of
national intelligence.48 As president, Obama repeatedly turned to Biden, his vicepresident and a principal figure on the NSC, to mediate the community’s internal
quarrels, and in this role he typically sided with the agency.
A good example of this came in 2009, when Director of National Intelligence
(DNI) Dennis Blair moved to expand the power of his office by demanding
the right to appoint CIA station chiefs, who were the senior American intelligence officers in the countries in which they operated. For decades, the agency’s
leadership had enjoyed this right. In 2005, after Congress created the ODNI and
abolished the position of the DCI, where this right lay had become confused.
This disruptive reorganization, responding to lessons learned from intelligence
failures contributing to 9/11, had failed to clarify the new lines of authority and
responsibility between the DNI and the DCIA. Blair, an admiral who had earned
his stars through an assertive approach to leadership, and who became DNI with
a reputation for causing intramural controversy, reasoned that the CIA’s choice of
station chief might not be in the best interests of the ODNI or the community as
a whole, and he worried that the system was being used as a cushy ‘pre-retirement
circuit’ for ageing case officers.49 Blindsiding DCIA Leon Panetta, he sent a directive to all agency stations, claiming the authority to designate or remove these
officers. When Panetta reacted with a cable of his own instructing everyone to
ignore Blair’s missive, Biden stepped in, siding with Panetta, albeit with the caveat
that all future appointments required ODNI consultation.50 In thwarting Blair’s
ambition, Biden showed his allegiance to the DCIA (they were golf buddies),
while revealing something of his political instincts, since what had begun as an
intra-community bureaucratic struggle threatened to become a public source of
embarrassment to the White House.
Biden revealed these instincts again in 2014, when he intervened in a feud
between DCIA John Brennan and the chairwoman of the SSCI, Senator Diane
Feinstein. That March, Feinstein accused the CIA of spying on the committee as
it finalized its eagerly awaited report on Langley’s Bush-era Rendition, Detention and Interrogation (RDI) programme. Such behaviour would have violated
the constitutional principle of the separation of powers, the Fourth Amendment
and the agency’s charter, which prohibits domestic intelligence-gathering. Brennan
denied the senator’s allegations, but journalists had already picked them up, and
there was soon talk of a DOJ investigation into them. For the White House, this
looked terrible. As Brennan later recalled, a public spat between a senior Democrat
in Congress and a Democratic-appointed DCIA ‘did not make for good politics’.51
Biden supported the SSCI’s inquiry into the RDI programme and had never
accepted the CIA’s claims that the harshness of its techniques had been exaggerRobert Bowie to DCI, 2 May 1977, Notes from conversations with senators, Feb. 1977, CREST.
See Chris Wipple, The spymasters: how the CIA directors shape history and the future (London: Simon & Schuster,
2020), pp. 242–3; Marc Ambinger, ‘Spy v. spy: Joe decides’, Atlantic, 25 June 2009, https://www.theatlantic.
com/politics/archive/2009/06/spy-v-spy-joe-decides/20159/; James Kirchick, ‘Turf warrior’, New Republic, 25
Jan. 2020, https://newrepublic.com/article/72702/turf-warrior.
Wipple, Spymasters, p. 243.
Brennan, Undaunted, p. 321.
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Uncomfortable with paramilitary covert action
While Biden will be a pro-intelligence president, everything has its limits and this
characterization is no exception. He has never been comfortable with paramilitary
covert action, the temporary transfer of special operations forces to the CIA or the
wider trend of militarizing intelligence priorities, resources and assets,practices
leading to what one journalist has called the transformation of the CIA into ‘a
killing machine, an organization consumed with man hunting’.56 Indeed, as early
as 1974 he signed a bill that would have banned covert action—although this was
partly a gesture, as the bill was submitted with little expectation of passing. With
so many revelations about agency misdeeds appearing in the press, savvy members
of Congress like him wanted to signal to their constituencies that they took
these transgressions seriously.57 This posturing notwithstanding, that same year
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ated. In December 2008, the incoming vice-president had dressed down outgoing
DCIA Michael Hayden after he had suggested that rendition protocols and waterboarding did not really amount to torture. Biden interrupted Hayden mid-sentence,
as if he were back on the SSCI and cross-examining him, exclaiming: ‘Oh, come
on, General. You shipped them to these places so that you could rough them up, so
you could get information.’52 This passion during the transition notwithstanding,
in 2014 Biden saw no value in calling the agency out for further possible misdeeds,
especially as the beating it would receive from the forthcoming publication of the
SSCI’s report would already be brutal.
So, that March, he received the two protagonists at his official residence, promptly
addressing the issues in his convivial manner: ‘We’ve got to fix this, folks, for the
good of the country. We really do. And I don’t want us to leave here today without
agreeing to do so.’53 That day, Feinstein agreed to end the public war of words
on the understanding that, if her charges were proven true, pending an in-house
investigation by the CIA’s Inspector-General (IG), she would be owed an apology.
Brennan accepted these terms. Months later, after the IG found that agency technicians had indeed accessed the computers of committee staffers, he apologized. Feinstein thanked him for it, and no further action was taken. In his memoirs, Brennan
wrote that he ‘deeply appreciated [Biden’s] personal involvement’ in resolving the
dispute.54 Later that year, Biden backed Brennan again, adding his political weight
to the CIA’s move to bury the SSCI’s full torture report, releasing only a sanitized
summary. To this day the full report, one of the most significant in the annals of
accountability, continues to languish under lock and key.55
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he signed the Hughes–Ryan amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, which
required presidents to sign ‘findings’—that is, to approve in writing and then
report in a timely manner to Congress any expenditure of appropriated funds on
covert operations. In 1977, in a revealing private conversation with high-ranking
analyst Robert Bowie, he articulated his anxieties about covert action. According
to Bowie’s notes, Biden expressed ‘concern about covert operations on US persons
overseas’ and ‘concern about secrecy’. Heralding twenty-first-century developments, he highlighted his ‘concern about the status of the military man [at the
CIA]’, warning that such figures were ‘inclined to “drop the bomb” as a solution
to problems’.58
During the 1980s, Biden’s worries about paramilitary covert action led to
several confrontations with the very person he was helping to stop leaks—none
other than Casey. It is testament to his nervousness about these kinds of operations that he was prepared to clash with the DCI over them, someone with whom
he otherwise enjoyed good relations. Under Casey, a former member of the Office
of Strategic Services (OSS) who had idolized the risk-taking Major-General ‘Wild
Bill’ Donovan and had developed a taste for dramatic undercover escapades and
paramilitary adventures, the agency engaged in a dizzying number of them,
leading one mentee to christen him ‘the godfather’ of covert action.59 According
to one historian, compared to 1979, Carter’s final year in office, covert operations
increased fivefold during Reagan’s first term, with 50 taking place in 1984 alone.60
Capturing the moment, on 10 October 1983 Newsweek announced: ‘The CIA is
back in business’.61
In Afghanistan, collaborating with the Saudi government and Pakistan’s InterServices Intelligence (ISI), the agency sent billions of dollars in cash and weapons,
including Stinger surface-to-air missiles, to the mujahideen, while carrying out
Casey’s directive to ‘go out and kill me 10,000 Soviets until they give up’.62 In
Iran, it facilitated the Reagan administration’s arms-for-hostages deal, at odds
with the declared policy that the United States does not negotiate with terrorists. In Nicaragua, it solicited Saudi funds, proceeds from its illicit weapon sales
to Tehran, and other private donations to circumvent congressional restrictions
concerning the financing and arming of the Contras, triggering the Iran–Contra
Affair. Long before these activities came to light, Biden was sounding the alarm on
what he saw as a dangerous phase in CIA history, where risky covert action was
being sanctioned without proper scrutiny, by the simple scratch of the president’s
fountain pen. In October 1981, he told journalists that when he learned of an
imminent operation in the Middle East that was ‘so outrageous’ it beggared belief,
he compelled Casey to rethink what he was doing. He did, and it was dropped.63
punch.org/2019/07/10/joe-biden-protector-of-the-deep-state/.
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In 1982, Biden’s tolerance of Casey’s freewheeling expired. By this point, the
gruff DCI had shown a pattern of disdain for congressional oversight, epitomized
by one observation that he ‘treats us like mushrooms—he keeps us in the dark and
feeds us manure’.64 Under his directorship, the agency had narrowed the scope of
its briefings on covert action to both the House and Senate intelligence committees. It also stretched to the limit its statutory requirement to notify Congress
about anticipated operations, waiting months before bringing committees into the
loop. Even though Casey retained the support of SSCI chairman Goldwater—
who confessed to being a ‘little old-fashioned’, clarifying that ‘When it comes to
covert operations, it would be best if they didn’t have to tell us anything’—Biden,
still on the committee, was not such a pushover.
That February, Biden pressed Goldwater to subpoena Casey to testify to the
committee about ‘some of the intelligence questions raised by the difficult situation in El Salvador’, where the CIA was operating from offices on the Ilopango
airbase, the centre of its training and supply missions to the Contras in Nicaragua
and Honduras.65 By spring, Biden was calling Casey out in the press: ‘You have
to be an investigative reporter to find out anything now.’66 In July, he pointblank demanded the buccaneering spymaster’s resignation upon discovering that
he had failed to disclose to the nomination committee details about his personal
financial dealings, including investments, debt and board positions. ‘Mr Casey has
displayed a consistent pattern of omissions, misstatements, and contradictions,’
Biden protested, in a stunning rebuke of a serving spy chief.67
Biden’s exposure to Vietnam and the conflicts in central America mentioned
above instilled in him a wariness about paramilitary covert action and indeed any
use of force implemented by American boots on the ground in the global South.
This was not an expression of idealism or anti-war activism. While at university
in the 1960s, he had never been drawn into the campus protests that were sweeping
the country, maintaining what journalists have described as ‘conspicuous psychic
distance from the antiwar fervor of the times’.68 Nevertheless, he was still seared
by the fighting in south-east Asia and its blowback in the United States. Speaking
to the graduating class at Syracuse in 2009, he recollected that at the time of his
own graduation he had been shocked by the degree to which Vietnam, a war in
a faraway place, had taken America ‘to the brink’.69 Just as the end appeared in
sight, he lamented, the Tet Offensive occurred, leaving him ‘shot through with
pain and grief ’.70 As he witnessed the country tear itself apart, cultivating a toxic
environment in which tragedies like the assassinations of the Reverend Martin
Luther King and Senator Bobby Kennedy occurred, he was gripped by a ‘sense of
James Bamford, ‘Confidence man’, Washington Post, 14 Oct. 1990.
Barry Goldwater to Joe Biden, 12 Feb. 1982, CREST; Barry Goldwater to William Casey, 23 Feb. 1982,
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Demilitarizing the community
During the 1990s, Biden showed that he was not necessarily opposed to all
instances of covert action and intervention, especially in places other than the
global South and where considerations about human rights and the Responsibility
to Protect doctrine came into play. As the conflict in Yugoslavia worsened, he
pressed President Bill Clinton to get the United Nations to lift its arms embargo,
which favoured the Serbians, who controlled the country’s weapons industries,
and which had placed Bosnia’s Muslims at a disadvantage. He supported not only
sending CIA officers to train and arm Bosnians so as to level the playing field, but
also the deployment of American forces there, provided they were given a clear
mission and exit strategy. As diplomat Richard Holbrooke recalled, this led to
‘some of the most emotional and contentious struggles of the Clinton Administration’, and Biden was an advocate of the measures, not an opponent of them.74
This notwithstanding, from the late 2000s, as the global ‘war on terror’
evolved into what commentators called ‘the long war’, centred on Afghanistan
and Pakistan, Biden, now vice-president, reverted to type, becoming a strong
critic of both covert and overt intervention.75 In Afghanistan, with operations
like ‘Jawbreaker’, he had seen the agency evolve from information-gatherers into
man-hunters, spearheading efforts to track down and kill high-value terrorists
such as Osama bin Laden.76 Indeed, after 9/11, the first Americans there had not
71
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hopelessness and helplessness’.71 As he entered politics, he recalled thinking about
how quickly the United States had been pulled into the quagmire. At first, involvement had been limited to low-level influence operations coupled with advice from
the military to win ‘hearts and minds’ and its training of anti-communist forces
in Saigon and the countryside.72 However, these forays soon escalated, resulting
in ‘search and destroy’ operations and the commitment of half a million troops,
whose air and ground activities spilled across the region. He also remembered,
as a freshman senator, being anxious about the war’s impact on citizens’ faith in
government. In fact, in May 1975, he wrote to political philosopher Hannah Arendt
to express his interest in a speech she had given, at Boston’s Fanueil Hall, about
how people’s trust in government had been shattered by official lies and deception about the war.73 It was partly through these memories that he approached
debates about covert operations in the 1980s. Vietnam had taught him that covert
meddling overseas was the thin end of the wedge, and he was determined that
central America would not become another south-east Asia. These were lessons
he has never forgotten.
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been service personnel but CIA paramilitary teams.77 This promptly became a
powerful trend in Langley. As retired case officer Alex Finley has written, the
prominence to which the paramilitary side of the agency had risen was easily
perceptible, with more officers seen walking the corridors with buzz cuts, dressed
in cargo pants and tight-fitting T-shirts, and using curt military punctilios like
‘Yes, Sir’ than ever before.78 In his memoirs, Hayden recollected that, before the
confirmation hearings of one of his successors as DCIA, General David Petraeus, a
combat commander, he had warned the nominee: ‘Dave ... CIA has never looked
more like the OSS than it does now’.79 Remembering what the old OSS hand
Casey had done to the agency, Biden was determined to halt this militarization,
shifting the CIA’s focus away from simply counterterrorist operations and back to
the overarching objective of the production of national intelligence.
Biden brought this determination into the open in mid-2009 as the Obama
administration faced pressure to intensify military efforts in Afghanistan. Those
pushing for escalation included General Stanley McChrystal, a special operations officer who headed the International Security Assistance Force; Admiral
Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Robert Gates, Secretary of
Defense; and Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State. The antithesis of Biden, Clinton
supported the further transformation of the agency into a war-fighting machine.
According to one of her aides, her position was: ‘All you need to deal with
terrorism ... is CIA, drones and special ops.’80 Several options were put before
Obama. At the low-cost end was a mission narrowly focused on counterterrorism.
This would rely upon paramilitary activities, special forces and unmanned aerial
vehicles or drones—then jointly operated by the agency and the US Air Force—
to hunt down and kill Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders. At the high-cost end was
a broader mission of counter-insurgency, designed to provide security to the
Afghan population while winning its goodwill, village by village, creating an
environment where terrorist networks could not survive, thus ending the war.
This would involve an expansive intelligence presence throughout the country; a
surge of tens of thousands of combat troops; and stability operations that shared
some common features with earlier endeavours in nation-building, which had
since become controversial.81
Biden’s opposition to the counter-insurgency option was spirited. He worried
that it would intensify the muscular, no-holds-barred, conception of intelligence
and further distract the community from its core mission of preventing strategic
surprise. Moreover, all the options would extend a conflict that he believed was
the previous administration’s fight and was ultimately unwinnable. Indeed, he
feared that Republicans would exploit the moment to christen it ‘Obama’s War’.82
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‘We can’t defeat the Taliban,’ concurred his friend Leslie Gelb; so it was time to
withdraw.83
DCIA Leon Panetta sat in on these discussions, recalling that Biden challenged
McChrystal’s requests ‘again and again’. ‘More than anyone else,’ he remembered,
‘Biden raised the specter of Vietnam, of incremental increases in commitment
without a clear plan or exit strategy.’84 The vice-president’s analogy failed to resonate with Obama and his inner circle. The president himself rejected it as ‘a false
reading of history’.85 Susan Rice, Ambassador to the UN, spoke even more bluntly,
asserting that Vietnam was not ‘the frame of reference for every decision—or
any decision, for that matter. I’m sick and tired of reprising all of the traumas
and the battles and the psychoses of the 1960s.’86 After a summer-long drama of
tense discussions, a test of will between an inexperienced president and seasoned
military commanders, Obama steered something of a middle course, authorizing
what might best be characterized as expedited counter-insurgency, with a surge of
30,000 troops and an 18-month expiration date. As vice-president, Biden had only
a limited ability to act as a counterpoint when Gates and key Pentagon figures,
buttressed by the hawkish Clinton, had the president’s ear on this.
It was the same story in spring 2011, when Biden’s objections to the Bin Laden
raid were drowned out. By then, the CIA had surmised the location of the terrorist leader by tracking one of his couriers to a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan.
Obama asked his closest advisers for their view on whether they ought to send Seal
Team Six, using stealth helicopters, across the border to kill him. As Gates recalls,
‘Biden was against the operation’.87 With an eye on the 2012 election, just 18 months
away, ‘the political consequences of failure’ weighed on his mind.88 He worried
about the lives of some two dozen servicemen, especially when he felt the intelligence pointing to Bin Laden’s whereabouts was weak. Moreover, Biden shared
Gates’s fear—referring to Operation Eagle Claw, President Carter’s failed attempt
to rescue 53 hostages from Tehran in 1980—that ‘something almost always goes
wrong in this kind of military operation’.89 For these reasons, he advised against
the raid. But he was outvoted. In a sign of how far these kinds of activities had
blended into the intelligence community’s responsibilities, while the assault was
executed by the Joint Special Operations Command and Seals, it was run by the
agency, who was given control over these forces to preserve plausible deniability.
Now sitting in the Oval Office, Biden finally has the authority to make the
intelligence community less about covert operations, paramilitary affairs and
military support in wars around the world, and more about cogitating quietly
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Pakistan’, 1 Dec. 2009, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-addressnation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan.
Mann, Obamians, pp. 132–3.
Gates, Duty, p. 543.
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Conclusion
This article has attempted to throw some light on what intelligence professionals
can expect from their new principal consumer. To reiterate: we are not claiming
to possess a crystal ball through which we can predict exactly what will happen.
How presidents use intelligence at any given moment can be conditioned not only
by the interplay of competing voices within the domestic policy-making context,
but by the rough and tumble of international affairs as well. All things being equal,
however, we believe that Biden has an extensive track record of engagement with
the intelligence community on the basis of which one can evaluate the likely
direction of travel with confidence. Indeed, we hope that once his presidency has
concluded and documents are declassified, scholars in the future will compare
what we have written with his administration’s actual record and find our conclusions valid.
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about strategic threats. Now, more than twelve months into his presidency, he
has started doing this. At the CIA, he replaced DCIA Gina Haspel—a career
officer who climbed the company ladder on the operations side of the business
and who earned notoriety for her role as chief of a secret prison in Thailand—
with veteran diplomat William Burns. Biden’s eagerness to get the agency back on
an intelligence track can also be detected in his selection of Burns’s deputy, David
Cohen, who held the position for two years under Obama. A finance expert who
spent five years at the Department of Treasury tracking terrorist money trails
through the warrens of international banking, before crafting Obama’s economic
strangulation of Iran, Cohen is a practitioner of analysis, not covert action.
Further reflecting this demilitarization and refocusing on strategic intelligence,
as this article underwent peer review the CIA announced the creation of a China
Mission Center.90
The same conclusions can be drawn from Biden’s choice of DNI, international
legal expert Avril Haynes. Indeed, all these appointments speak to the president’s
long-held desire to have the community led by thinkers, not ‘military men’ like
Hayden and Petraeus. Importantly, as much as Biden’s decision to withdraw from
Afghanistan ended America’s longest war, it should also be read as his drawing
a line under a period when a military-style mentality had swept through the
community. Even as American troops and Afghan civilians were attacked by the
Islamic State’s affiliate ISIS-K in the final days of the evacuation at Kabul airport,
Biden resisted calls to rebase special forces in the country. Instead, he pointed to
the United States’ growing strength in ‘over-the-horizon capabilities’, a nod to the
use of airpower and cyber warfare.91 Whatever the future holds in Afghanistan,
and whatever events might conspire against him, Biden will prefer computers and
drones to commandos and divisions there and elsewhere in the global South.

Mark Hosenball, ‘Biden’s CIA director creates unit focused on China’, Reuters, 7 Oct. 2021, https://www.
reuters.com/world/us/bidens-cia-director-creates-high-level-unit-focusing-china-2021-10-07/.
‘Transcript of Biden’s speech on the US withdrawal from Afghanistan’, New York Times, 31 Aug. 2021.
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For at least the next three years, the collectors of information and the everyman
intelligence analyst who works in the organizational trenches can rest easier than
they have over the past four. Biden has the consumption habits of Truman, not
Trump. He sees the community much like a university, whose job it is to study
the world, look over the horizon and foresee brewing trouble. He values his
‘newspaper’, which he trusts will come to him in an apolitical, matter-of-fact
presentation, directly responsive to the national security priorities his administration has laid down. There will be no cordon sanitaire around the Oval Office,
blocking spy chiefs from meeting the president and potentially telling him things
he may not want to hear.
Biden respects the importance of secrecy as a first principle and will not allow
the quality of intelligence product, upon which vital national security decisionmaking rests, to be compromised by leakers, whom he will almost certainly prosecute, should they appear. Oversight will come from congressional intelligence
committees. Biden knows these committees as one who has proudly served on
them, and he sees cooperation with them as part of healthy democratic governance. With these qualities, he will help to restore the morale of the community,
which was wounded by his predecessor. As a pro-intelligence president, institutional recovery and strengthening will take place.
The planners of paramilitary covert action and military-style intelligence
operations will likely be greeted icily. Biden will entertain only low-threshold,
meticulously planned covert operations that have clear exit strategies and are
signed off on by all appropriate authorities, including Congress. Even allowing
for the unexpected pressures of high office and the volatility of international
affairs, he will never stake everything on an enormous roll of the paramilitary
covert action dice, as JFK did with the Bay of Pigs, Reagan with Iran–Contra,
or Obama with the Bin Laden raid. Covert operations and the use of force in the
global South go against the lessons he learned from Vietnam and central America,
but also against his own instincts as a wily politician who realizes that failed or
exposed covert action hurts as much at the ballot box as it does in American
embassies around the world. The idea that intelligence agencies should resemble
paramilitary organizations, entering war zones and concentrating on man-hunts
and killing, is anathema to him. In his view, it is the job of the military—not the
intelligence community—to jump out of planes, kick down doors and occasionally pull the trigger. As the screw of history turns, with the era of counterterrorism and asymmetric warfare against dispersed enemies like Al-Qaeda and the
Islamic State potentially winding down amid a return to great power rivalry
between the United States, Russia and China, Biden’s traditional emphasis on
stealing secrets and the production of national intelligence seems appropriate and
timely. We might even say that, as principal consumer, he looks set to restore a
twentieth-century approach to intelligence while responding to the re-emergence
of twentieth-century threats.
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